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The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: Sweden 1887 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann




We analyse the Swedish general elections that took place in spring and autumn 1887. Our aim 
is to discover which groups of voters were responsible for the severe losses that the supporters 
of free trade suffered in the second of these contests, and that allowed the protectionists to 
gain the majority in parliament and to initiate a new tariff policy. We find that while capital 
owners and wage earners consistently favoured free trade, in the spring election only the larg-
est farmers supported protectionism. By autumn, political preferences among smallholders 
and middling farmers had shifted in favour of protectionism, too. As these groups were not 
specialised in the production of import competing goods, we assume that the political land-
slide in the autumn elections can be attributed to the influence of anti-free trade propaganda. 
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1.   The elections of 1887 and Sweden’s turn to protectionism 
From the 1870s, Sweden like other European countries experienced what has been called a 
‘grain invasion’ from America and Russia (O'Rourke, 1997). The average yearly import of 
rye trebled from the 1860s to the 1880s, while that of wheat grew sixteen fold. Between 1861 
and 1870, only 11 percent of the rye and 5 percent of the wheat consumed in Sweden had 
been imported; by the 1880s, these shares had grown to 27 and 46 percent, respectively 
(Lindahl et al., 1937: 30 ff.). Falling international transport costs caused similar developments 
where commodities produced by the raw material and capital goods industries were concerned 
(National Central Bureau of Statistics, 1972: 198 ff.). 
Whereas a number of countries, notably Great Britain and Denmark, retained their free trade 
orientation in the face of such pressures, Sweden joined France and Germany in imposing 
tariffs on agricultural and industrial imports. Kevin O’Rourke (1997: 778 ff.) argued that 
where agriculture was concerned, the political choices of governments were related on the one 
hand to how the grain invasion affected land rents, and on the other to the weight of agricul-
tural interests in domestic politics. A similar argument can be made for industrial imports. As 
for Sweden, land rents and industrial profits were negatively affected by the shifts in the sec-
toral trade balances since the 1870s, and in reaction, interest groups demanding tariffs were 
formed (Esaiasson, 1990: 83 ff.). The issue dominated two elections held in spring and au-
tumn 1887. Both returned free trade majorities. The relevant literature accordingly argues that 
Sweden’s turn to protectionism a year later was not due to these elections, but rather to a po-
litical scandal (Verney, 1957: 107; Lewin, 1988: 46 f.): After the autumn election, the protec-
tionists discovered that one of the members for Stockholm – who all supported free trade – 
had neglected to pay a negligible amount of his taxes. Electoral law did not only disqualify 
this member but, owing to an oversight in its framing, the other twenty-two members for 
Stockholm, too. The votes cast for them were declared invalid, which gave the protectionists 
the majority. Still, this does not mean that the elections did not play a crucial role in the 
switch to a new tariff policy. If the Stockholm free traders had been forced to resign in favour 
of the protectionists some time after the spring election, the majority in parliament would 
have been be weaker but unchanged in favour of free trade. Free trade supporters would still 
have had a majority of 7 seats over the protectionists (see Table 1).  It was the autumn elec-
tion that fatally weakened the free trade cause. Only now were the protectionists able to gain a 
majority by ousting 23 free trade supporters, and only now were they able to form a new gov-
ernment that brought about the change in trade policies. 
Apart from their political importance, there is another reason why it is rewarding to study the 
two Swedish elections where commercial protection was at the core of the dispute: In Sweden 
as elsewhere, we can expect tariffs on imports to have affected different social and economic 
groups in different ways. At the most basic level, industrial tariffs benefitted capital owners 
and agricultural tariffs farmers, whereas all other groups suffered from the rising prices, but 
this is only the broadest picture. Agriculture was nowhere homogeneous; farm size and the 
degree and type of specialisation complicate the issue. Thus, large landowners who regularly   3
supplied grain to the market would gain from protection whereas smallholders may have pro-
duced for home consumption only. Tariffs would then not affect them. Likewise, farmers spe-
cialising in the production of wheat or rye naturally benefitted from protection, but others, 
who specialised in animal husbandry may have needed to buy grain as fodder; consequently 
tariffs would harm them.  
In Sweden, bread grain producers – especially wheat farmers – were hit hardest by the com-
mercial changes that took place from the 1870s to the 1880s. Owing to the specific nature of 
most capital goods needed for grain farming, they were unable at short notice to transfer their 
assets to less import competing sectors. Trade models such as the specific factors model used 
to analyse the commercial policy preferences of voters would predict them to favour protec-
tionism (cf. Viner, 1931). Farmers focusing on animal husbandry, by contrast, were not ex-
posed to increasing competition from abroad: Pork imports may have grown, but the prices 
remained relatively stable in the long run, given that they were quite variable in the short run 
(National Central Bureau of Statistics, 1972: 196; Jörberg, 1972: 320 f.). Other animal prod-
ucts, such as milk or cheese were no important import commodities at all. Pig and dairy farm-
ers can therefore be expected to have been indifferent or to have favoured free trade.
1 As the 
introduction of tariffs on goods produced for the home market by the raw material and capital 
goods industries was also discussed in 1887 (Bohlin, 2005: 14 f.), voters with capital incomes 
should have supported protectionism, too. 
While not neglecting capital owners and voters who earned wages, we will focus on the agri-
cultural sector for two reasons. First, the majority of the population and voters were working 
in agriculture. In 1887 they constituted roughly 65 percent of the entire working population 
(Lindahl et al., 1937: 2). Second, because land is an immobile factor of production, we can 
define the tariff political interests of farmers in regional terms. However, when we try to de-
termine the interests of capital owners, mobility is a problem: We can not be sure if they cast 
their votes at the place where they invested their assets. In consequence, constituencies with 
capital intensive industries did not necessarily have voters who received the main part of their 
income from capital returns. This leaves us with a number of different types of farmers, i.e. of 
farmers who worked estates of different sizes and were specialised in different ways. Asking 
if their commercial policy interests matched the expectations that can be derived from trade 
models – that is, if their behaviour can be considered rational – is well worth the effort. 
As for prior research, studies that aim at answering questions concerning the link between 
commercial policy interests and voting behaviour have repeatedly been undertaken in the con-
text of late nineteenth-century history (e.g. Klug, 2001). However, most of them used tradi-
tional econometric approaches such as simple logistic regressions that, when applied to vot-
ing, can produce problematic results. Modern election analysis offers tools – in particular 
King’s algorithm – which provide far superior estimates. By providing point estimates and 
                                        
1   The issue of the homogeneity of agriculture has been extensively debated. Much of the relevant literature 
(Gerschenkron, 1943; Webb, 1982; Schonhardt-Bailey, 1998; Klug, 2001; Lehmann, 2010) refers to Im-
perial Germany. However, Bohlin (2009) recently extended the debate to Sweden.   4
confidence intervals for the votes of different groups of voters for every constituency, it ex-
tracts much more information from the available data than simpler methods. King’s Algo-
rithm is introduced in detail below; for the present, suffice to say that the method here applied 
is superior to older approaches.  
To date, there are only two historical cases where King’s algorithm has been applied: Gary 
King et al. (2008) examined Weimar Germany in order to show who voted for Hitler, and 
Sibylle Lehmann (2010) analysed elections in Imperial Germany to determine which groups 
of voters were responsible for the country’s turn to protectionism. Swedish nineteenth-century 
elections have never been studied from this perspective, and have in general received little 
attention. Elis Håstad (1941) provided a basis for further analyses by determining the political 
affiliations of the candidates in the two elections of 1887 and in the one of 1890. Leif Lewin 
et al. (1976) estimated the impact of the social structure on voting behaviour in the period 
from 1887 to 1968. This is the only quantitative attempt to investigate the electorate and its 
voting behaviour in Sweden. Lewin et al.’s work provides a good overview of the electorate 
but is not detailed enough to compare the voting behaviour of different categories of farmers 
and of other occupations with expectations derived from trade models or empirical results. 
The authors grouped occupations with similar voting behaviour and analysed this for just four 
extracted groups. Some political scientists, for instance Peter Esaiason (1990), have studied 
electoral campaigns during this period, but in a rather descriptive way. With regard to trade 
policy, Jan Bohlin (2005; 2009) focused on the actual effective tariffs protection in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the impact of tariffs on the income of different 
groups of farmers. How the decision to introduce tariffs came about, and how the electorate 
voted in this context, are issues outside the scope of his research. These are questions that the 
available data and modern methodology allow us to analyse in much more detail than prior 
research has been able to do.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first provide an overview of Swedish elec-
toral law (section 2). Thereafter, we discuss the formation of commercial policy interests (sec-
tion 3). Following this, we present our analysis and its results (section 4), and a final section 
concludes. 
2.   The Swedish electoral system 
At the time of the tariffs debates, Sweden had a two-chamber system where a law had to be 
accepted in both chambers with simple majority (Verney, 1957: 50 ff.; Särlvik, 2002: 232 f.). 
The First Chamber was elected by the councils of the provinces (läns) and by cities outside 
the provinces; it does not concern us here. The Second Chamber was more popular in charac-
ter; it was elected in general elections by all enfranchised citizens. However, in late nine-
teenth-century Sweden the franchise was still severely restricted. The electoral law passed in 
1866 and valid until the reform bill of 1907 stipulated that voters had either to own real estate 
of a taxable value of at least 1,000 kronor, or for at least five years had leased farm property   5
whose taxable value exceeded 6,000 kronor, or paid taxes on an income of at least 800 kronor 
p.c. a year.
2 In 1885, there were about 330,000 enfranchised persons in Sweden, almost 
240,000 of who had gained the right to vote because they owned estates. Only about 11,000 
were leaseholders, and fewer than 80,000 owed their voting right to their income. In the dif-
ferent constituencies, the rate of enfranchisement varied between c. 3 and just over 10 percent 
of the population (BISOS, 1885: 74 f.; 1887: XIV ff., 230). 
The constituencies were formed on the basis of the administrative units below the provinces 
(called härad, domsaga or fögderi), with most consisting of between one and five such dis-
tricts. When they were constituted, the aim was to form one for c. 40,000 inhabitants each. 
Towns composed their own constituencies. Those with a population of 10,000 or more formed 
one each where one member was elected for every 10,000 residents, while smaller towns 
could group together and form separate constituencies, electing one member for every 6000 
inhabitants (Verney, 1957: 52 f). This measure seems to have been designed in order to make 
up for the smaller share of persons entitled to vote in small towns. In 1885, on average 1700 
eligible voters were registered per constituency (BISOS, 1885: 46 ff.). Altogether, there were 
186 constituencies, 41 of which were urban. The law of 1866 created a mixed system of direct 
and indirect elections. Voting was to be direct in towns that returned members of their own 
and indirect where a large constituency was formed by a group of districts or small towns. 
However, districts and small towns could choose to elect members directly, which they in-
creasingly did (Verney, 1957: 53). By spring 1887, only 60 indirect constituencies were left; 
by autumn, that number had fallen to 41 (Caramani, 2000). In some of these voting seems to 
have been open – making instances of group and other pressures more likely –, but elsewhere 
it was always by secret ballot (Särlvik, 2002: 232). 
The electoral law also stipulated that elections had to be held every three years regardless of 
additional elections that might have to take place in between due to the dissolution of the par-
liament by the king. Actually, this is what happened in 1887 (Verney, 1957: 106 f.). In the 
years before, the protectionists had gradually gained ground in the First Chamber, and a first 
law in favour of tariffs had been passed in the Second Chamber. Before a joint vote could be 
taken, King Oskar II – pleased to be able to demonstrate his political power and to use his 
dissolution prerogative – dissolved parliament. The government that had suggested this meas-
ure aimed at achieving a clearer picture about public opinion (Anderson, 1955/70: 373 f.). In 
consequence, an extraordinary election in March 1887 became necessary, but the regular elec-
tion of autumn 1887 was held regardless.  
Both elections of that year were overshadowed by the tariff issue to such a degree that they 
more closely resembled referenda about tariffs. Campaigning in spring of 1887 was intense, 
with statements about the tariff question dominating. Many candidates published so-called 
‘political confessions’ in local newspapers, in which they stated whether they were free trade 
                                        
2   The law of 1866 actually determined the values in riksdaler. For the relation between riksdaler and kro-
nor (used from 1873) see Jörberg (1972: 79 ff.).   6
or tariff supporters (Esaiasson, 1990).  Another new trend was the appearance of interest 
groups all over the country, for instance the ‘Friends of Swedish Work’ who demanded spe-
cific tariffs, and the ‘Union against Food Tariffs’, whose members favoured free trade. Most 
of these organisations were founded by parliamentarians (Esaiasson, 1990: 83 ff.). Initially, 
there was a huge upsurge in interest. Overall turnout increased from c. 26 percent of the eligi-
ble voters in 1884 to more than 66 percent in spring 1887, with participation in rural areas, 
where involvement in political discussions was usually weak, growing particularly strongly. 
By autumn, however, a certain voter fatigue could be observed. Average turnout fell to c. 37 
percent, rural turnout to 32 percent (Caramani, 2000). 
The way the results of these elections were reported to the public differed from that of later 
contests. Political parties were only beginning to develop in late nineteenth-century Sweden 
(Verney, 1957: 98 ff.). In consequence, national statistics do not give the results by party, but 
rather the names of the candidates and the numbers of votes they received (BISOS, 1888: 45 
ff.). In order to determine how the electorate voted in spring and autumn 1887, it is therefore 
necessary to establish the political leaning of each individual member elected to parliament. 
This has been done on the basis of public statements, brochures and newspaper reports, which 
contain sufficient information to allow the identification of each candidate as either free trade 
supporting or protectionist (Håstad, 1941). Table 1 provides an overview of the results. 
Table 1: Results of the Swedish general elections 1887  
 
   1887a  1887b  
1887b post-
replacement* 
   Seats  in Percent Seats  in Percent Seats  in Percent 
Free-Trader  136 61.54 125 56.31 103  46.4 
Protectionist  85 27.78 97 43.69  119 53.6 
Total  221 100 222 100 222 100 
Source: Håstad (1941). 
* Results after the replacement in the Stockholm parliaments. 
As a result of the tax scandal described in the introduction, a protectionist majority was estab-
lished.
3 This majority formed a new government, and in 1888 tariffs were introduced for a 
number of agricultural and industrial products (Bohlin, 2005). 
Despite the consistent free trade majority that the elections of 1887 showed, there were inter-
esting shifts between spring and autumn, and interesting regional differences. Figure 1 shows 
the geographic distribution of the electorate’s preferences:  
                                        
3   Håstad (1941: 123 f.) suggested that the pro-tariff majority created by the disqualification of the Stock-
holm free-trader election slate actually meant that parliament reflected public opinion better. He argues 
that, although the population preferred protectionism, they did not gain the majority in the parliament be-
cause: a) the restricted suffrage allowed just a small number of people to vote in rural areas, where people 
tended to support protectionists; and b) the turnout was higher in cities, which were generally more free-
trade-orientated than rural areas. Thus, he claims that constitutional restrictions combined with a lower 
motivation among protectionists to vote biased the electoral result to the benefit of free-traders.    7
Figure 1: The results of the general elections of 1887 
 
 
Source: Håstad (1941: 128 ff.). 
 
Practically the whole country north of Uppsalas län was firmly pro free trade, and free traders 
had further strongholds in Malmöhus and Halland. The protectionists, by contrast, were strong 
in the rest of the south and on the islands of Öland and Gotland.    8
3.   Commercial policy interests and their determinants 
In determining how these trade political interests related to income and occupational speciali-
sation, we discuss wage earners and capital owners only in passing. We do have information 
on their income (BISOS, 1885: 46 ff.), but we can not be certain if or to what degree this de-
rived from capital returns. It might also just reflect high wages. Moreover, as mentioned in the 
introduction, even if they received a capital income only, we can not assume that they in-
vested their assets at the place where they cast their vote.  
Focusing on the remaining groups of voters, i.e. on those who owned or leased land, we need 
to determine if their specialisation on grain farming or animal husbandry matched their pref-
erences for protectionism or free trade, respectively. Unfortunately, Swedish national statistics 
do not provide data on the agricultural specialisation of the voters. What they do provide is 
detailed information on the value of the estates that the voters held (BISOS, 1885: 46 ff.). Re-
lating this information to Swedish land values from 1887 (Lindahl et al., 1937: 393) allows us 
to estimate the size of the farms owned or leased by the voters. In addition, we can use con-
stituency-level data on the area of farmland on the one hand, and on the output of wheat and 
rye and on the numbers of dairy cows and pigs on the other (BISOS, 1890).  
Bohlin (2009: 12), who examined the long-term income distributional effects of the tariffs 
introduced since the late 1880s, found a close match between farm size and specialisation: the 
larger the farm, the higher the degree of specialisation on bread grain production. He used 
detailed post-World War I data on the output mix of farms of different sizes (Höijer, 1921). 
Still, we can not simply assume that his results hold for our period, too. One of Bohlin’s 
(2009: 7 f.) core hypotheses is that owing to the high income elasticity of demand for meat 
and dairy products and the strong export demand in particular for butter, Swedish agriculture 
experienced an ongoing transformation in the direction of more animal produce in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1887, livestock farming was clearly less important 
than thirty years later. However, how important was it? Where was it concentrated, and can 
we relate its geographical concentration to free trade strongholds? 
Figure 2 below shows the geographical distribution of farm sizes, while figures 3 to 6 (appen-
dix) provide a general overview of that of bread grain production and animal husbandry. The 
maps are based on data collected in 1888 (BISOS, 1890), i.e. early enough for the introduc-
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Figure 2: Farm sizes 
 
Source: BISOS (1890). 
 
Farm sizes differed clearly between regions. Large estates existed in the neighbourhood of  
cities such as Stockholm, Kalmar and Göteborg and in densely urbanised Södermans län and 
Östergotland; in the north-west and extreme north of Sweden farms were also large. By con-  10
trast, smaller farms and smallholdings prevailed in less densely urbanised and more marginal 
parts of the country, i.e. in parts of the south and in Central Sweden. As for bread grain pro-
duction, we are considering the quantities of wheat and rye produced per hectare of agricul-
turally used land, which we here define as land used as garden, arable and pasture (BISOS, 
1890). Thus, we exclude both managed and unmanaged woodland. Wheat farming was con-
centrated around Stockholm, in Södermans län and in Malmöhus. In the north, owing to cli-
matic conditions, it practically did not occur, but it was also of minor importance in many 
southern regions, e.g. in Kronobergs län. Rye farming, too, was very rare in the north, being 
concentrated in middle Sweden and in the coastal districts of the south-east. Estimating the 
numbers of cows and pigs per hectare of farmland shows that dairy and pork farming were 
more unevenly distributed. Dairy farming was strong in middle Sweden, on parts of the west 
coast and in the extreme south east of the country. Pig farming, by contrast, was strong in 
Malmöhus and Kristanstads län and in parts of Vesternorrlands län. In the 1880s it still was to 
some extent an urban phenomenon. In many of the urban constituencies the residents were 
producing pork, with the density of pigs being as high as in some rural districts. 
While a geographical representation shows a vague association of farm size and specialisation 
– where farms were large, farmers seem to have produced more wheat; where holdings were 
small, they appear to have had more cows or pigs per unit of land – table 2 shows the link 
more clearly. We picked the constituencies where the output of bread grain and the number of 
dairy cows per hectare farmland was highest, and analysed the distribution of farm values and 
types of properties owned or leased by the voters. Obviously, due to the restricted suffrage 
smaller landholdings are underrepresented here, because owners of theses estates were ex-
cluded from voting.   11
Table 2: Overview structure of voters owning farms in the wheat and dairy dominated constituencies 
 
Wheat dominated constituencies  obs
On ave-
rage std dev.   min  max
Voters owning agricultural land worth 
1000-2000 Kronor  54 0.082 0.072 0.000 0.279
 Voters owning agricultural land worth 
2000-10,000 Kronor  54 0.268 0.197 0.000 0.700
Voters owning agricultural land worth  
10,000-30,000 Kronor  54 0.135 0.097 0.000 0.299
Voters owning agricultural land worth 
more than 30,000 Kronor  54 0.017 0.015 0.000 0.052
Voters owning other estates  54 0.200 0.192 0.014 0.652
Leaseholders  54 0.081 0.082 0.000 0.289
         
Dairy farming dominated constituencies  obs
On ave-
rage std dev.   min  max
Voters owning agricultural land worth 
1000-2000 Kronor  52 0.103 0.100 0.000 0.569
 Voters owning agricultural land worth 
2000-10,000 Kronor  52 0.327 0.260 0.000 0.814
Voters owning agricultural land worth  
10,000-30,000 Kronor  52 0.078 0.074 0.000 0.253
Voters owning agricultural land worth 
more than 30,000 Kronor  52 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.038
Voters owning other estates  52 0.233 0.219 0.004 0.653
Leaseholders  52 0.018 0.039 0.000 0.222
Source: BISOS (1890).         
 
As for bread grain farming, we consider wheat because in the course of the grain invasion the 
growth in imports affected producers of wheat more severely than producers of rye (c.f. p. 2). 
We examine 54 constituencies, i.e. the 30 percent with the highest wheat output per hectare 
agricultural land. Owing to the availability of data, in the case of dairy farming the 30 percent 
consist of the 52 constituencies where the number of cows per hectare farmland was highest. 
Both in the case of wheat production and in that of dairy farming, a high proportion of the 
voters held farms of medium size, having a value between 2000 and 10,000 kronor (27 and 33 
percent, respectively). However, where wheat farming dominated, voters from small farms 
were rarer (8 percent) than where farms focused on dairy production (10 percent). By con-
trast, voters with large farms, whose value exceeded 10,000 kronor, were more common in 
constituencies where wheat was produced than in those where farmers held cattle (14 vs. 8 
percent). Leaseholders and owners of land that the Swedish national statistics classified as 
non-agricultural have been included for the sake of completeness. Altogether, we can con-
clude that the tendency of large estates to specialise on bread grain production while small-
holdings focused on animal husbandry, which Bohlin (2009) established on the basis of post-
World War I data, was evident already at the end of the 1880s. Given these results, we would 
expect voters who owned large farms to favour protection and smallholders to vote for free 
trade – in other words, we are able to use farm sizes as an indicator of the specialisation and 
political views of the voters.    12
4.   Who voted for whom, and why? 
4.1.  The problem of Ecological Inference 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps: First, we discuss a problem that commonly besets elec-
tion analyses such as ours – that of Ecological Inference, then, we analyse the data with the 
help of a traditional approach to voting analysis, i.e. Goodman’s regression, and finally, we 
check and refine our preliminary results using King’s algorithm. 
In the introduction, we already briefly mentioned the Ecological Inference problem and prom-
ised a detailed discussion. This is indeed necessary as Ecological Inference commonly biases 
analyses such as ours. The nature of this problem can in fact very well be explained on the 
basis of our preliminary analysis. Thus, we know how many votes were cast for free-trade-
supporting candidates and how many for protectionists in the Swedish elections of 1887, and 
we can estimate how many voters were dairy and how many wheat farmers. This information 
is available for every constituency. What we are interested in is the voting behaviour of indi-
viduals, or at least of sub-aggregates, for example how many farmers with farms between 2.3 
and 4.6 hectares – i.e. those from the lowest property bracket – voted for free trade in a par-
ticular constituency. Why is answering such a question a problem? Assume that in one con-
stituency, 30 percent of the electorate consisted of those dairy farmers and that 30 percent of 
the votes were cast for candidates who supported free trade. In another constituency, 40 per-
cent of the electorate consisted of such farmers and 40 percent of votes were cast for free-
trade-supporting candidates. It thus seems that there is a perfect positive correlation of farm-
ers with farms between 2.3 and 4.6 hectares and votes for free trade. However, regardless of 
how intuitive this relationship may be, farmers with farms between 2.3 and 4.6 hectares may 
actually not have voted for free trade at all. The votes for free trade may have come from in-
dustrial workers, who could conceivably favour free-trade-supporting candidates in constitu-
encies dominated by agriculture. Hypothesising about the behaviour of individuals by using 
aggregate data can therefore be misleading: It means making inferences without considering 
the social environment of the individuals concerned. This is why the problem is called that of 
Ecological Inference. It is well known in political science: William Ogburn and Inez Goltra 
(1919) introduced it in the very first multivariate statistical analysis ever to have been pub-
lished in a political science journal, and it has been among the longest-standing unsolved 
problems in quantitative social science (King, 1997). Because of it, we can not be sure that the 
impression of a close association between farm size and preference for free trade or protec-
tion, which we gained above, is actually correct. 
Table 3 shows how the problem can be illustrated in a formal manner. Suppose we want to 
find out whether or not workers in a specific sector voted for parties that supported free trade. 
The table shows the problem for one constituency and for two groups of voters, i.e. for those 
favouring free trade and protection, respectively. Here the workers employed in sector J are 
the voters of interest.   13
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i x is the share of the workforce in constituency i employed in sector J. This could be, for exam-
ple, the share of farmers.  i V  is the share of votes for free-trade-supporting parties in the constituency i 
and 1- i V  the share of votes for parties that support protection.  i T  is the percentage turnout. These 
values are known. The unknown quantities of interest are: 
J
i λ , which is the share of workers in sector 
J in the constituency i that voted for free ;
J
i
− λ , which is the share of workers of sectors outside J that 
voted for free trade;
J
i β  , which is the turnout of the workers in sector J in the constituency i; and 
J
i
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which is the turnout of workers in other sectors. 
 
For every constituency, national statistics provide the values in the margins of the table, 
where index i indicates constituency i, and J indicates sector J. 
J
i X is the share of the work-
force in constituency i employed in sector J. This could be, for example, the share of farmers 
with between 2.3 and 4.6 hectares constituency i.  i V  is the share of votes for free-trade-
supporting parties in constituency i and 1- i V  the share of votes for parties that support protec-
tion.  i T  is the percentage turnout for constituency i. What these statistics do not show, how-
ever, are the values in the inner (framed) cells of the table, such as the shares of various occu-
pations in a particular constituency that voted for free trade, for protection, or abstained; that 
is the  i λ ’s and  i β ’s, which are not directly observed. 
J
i λ  is the share of workers in sector J in 
constituency I, who voted for free trade and 
J
i λ − 1  is the share of workers of sector J who 
voted for protection. For example, assuming that J is the agricultural sector, 
J
i λ  is the share of 
farmers who voted for free trade and 
J




− λ is the share of non-agricultural workers who voted for free trade, and 
J
i
− −λ 1  is 
the share of non-agricultural workers who voted for protection. 
J
i β is the turnout of the work-
ers in sector J in the constituency i. Clearly these parameters are the really relevant ones. If we 
can estimate these values, we obtain far more and better information about the voting behav-
iour of different sectors or, in our case, groups of farmers with different specialisations, than 
with the help of other approaches.    14
4.2.  Goodman’s approach 
One of the most prominent approaches to solving the problem of Ecological Inference relies 
on ecological regressions, which were developed by Leo Goodman (1953) and are therefore 
also called ‘Goodman’s Regression’. The design is simple. Referring to table 3, we know that: 









i i V    (1) 
This equation has the same form as a simple two variable ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion equation such as  
  Y=a + bX +e,        (2) 
where Y is the dependent variable, which is similar to  i V , the constant a equals
J
i λ , ( )
J
i X - 1 i s  





i  is the estimated coefficient for the independent variable 
and e is the error term. This method uses information from all constituencies together to pro-
duce estimates. The disadvantage is that it often produces impossible results, such as negative 
coefficients or coefficients above one, which implies that more than 100 percent of votes were 
cast by members of a certain group of voters. Nevertheless, we first apply this simple regres-
sion in order check the robustness of the results we obtain with the help of the more sophisti-
cated method, King’s Algorithm. 
Table 4 provides the estimates for the constant, i.e.
J
i λ . They show the same effects that al-
ready appear in figures 1 and 2 above: Smallholders seem to have voted for free trade (73.8 
percent), whereas large land owners (row 4) seem to have preferred protection. The weak-
nesses of Goodman’s regression are apparent here. Some of the estimated coefficients show 
negative signs, which implies that a negative number of voters from this particular group 
voted for free trade. Although this is logically of course impossible, the direction of voting 
behaviour provides useful information. Table 4 also shows the estimated coefficients for the 
autumn election. The effects still appear, although much weaker. Smallholders seem to have 
lost much of their preference for free trade.    15
Table 4: Goodman coefficients = the estimated constant a (simple OLS with robust standard errors) 
 
  Spring Election  Autumn election 
 Goodman  Obs.  R-squared  Goodman Obs.  R-squared 
Agriculture  0.738 177  0.01  0.099 177  0.02 
(1000-2000  Kronor)  (2.62)**     (0.44)   
Agriculture  0.275 172  0.10  0.126 172  0.16 
2000-10.000  Kronor)  (4.03)**     (1.75)   
Agriculture   -0.893  176  0.23  -0.857 176  0.17 
(10.000-30.000 Kronor)  (3.57)**      (2.88)**    
Agriculture -9.926  177  0.14  -6.593 177  0.06 
more than 30.000 Kronor)  (4.36)**      (2.59)*    
Owners of nonagricultural   1.081  185  0.13  1.132 185  0.17 
Estates (12.69)**      (11.76)**    
Leaseholders -1.654  178  0.18  -1.167 178  0.09 
 (4.46)**      (2.49)*    
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
Each observation was weighted with the number of voters per constituency. 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Note: The presented values are the estimates constant a in equation 2.  
Table 5 provides the estimates for Goodman’s regression, but now includes for some regres-
sions a dummy for constituencies in which the numbers of voters from the particular group 
exceeded 30 percent of the total electorate. The dummy for the category of farmers owning 
the smallest amount of land is positive (0.325) and significant: Constituencies in which the 
number of voters who were smallholders exceeded 30 percent voted significantly more 
strongly for free trade.   16
Table 5: Goodman coefficients = the estimated constant a (simple OLS with robust standard errors), 
including dummy for concentrated areas 
 
  Spring Election  Autumn election 
 Goodman Obs.  R-Squared  Goodman  Obs.  R-Squared 
Agriculture  0.325 177  0.03  0.157 177  0.02 
(1000-2000 Kronen) > 30%  (2.22)*      (1.01)     
Agriculture 0.508      -0.012     
(1000-2000  Kronen)  (1.63)     (0.04)    
Agriculture  0.106 172  0.85  0.080 172  0.16 
(2000-10.000 Kronen) > 30%  (1.03)      (0.77)     
Agriculture 0.088      -0.015     
(2000-10.000 Kronen)   (0.44)      (0.08)     
Owners of nonagricultural   -0.209  185  0.15  -0.287  185  0.19 
estates > 30%  (1.27)      (1.66)     
Owners of nonagricultural  1.510      1.720     
estates  (4.31)**     (4.82)**    
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
Note: same estimation as in Table 4, but including a dummy which is equal to 1 if the number of voters 
owning estates of this particular value exceeds 30% 
Goodmans’ regression already provide useful information, although the coefficients itself are 
not logically explainable. We therefore now turn to the alternative method, i.e. to Kings Algo-
rithm that was mentioned above. 
4.3.  King’s algorithm 
The most advanced and modern tool for election analysis, and the only one that allows us to 
solve the Ecological Inference problem, is King’s Algorithm. King (1997) starts out from the 
equation introduced by Goodman
4 (1953), but combines it with the ‘method of bounds’. The 
‘method of bounds’ derives from the observation that we can deterministically put some limits 
on individual behaviour from the available aggregate data. Assume for instance that we ob-
serve two types of voters (wheat and dairy farmers) and two voting options (voting or not vot-
ing). The turnout in constituency i ( i T ) is just the proportion of wheat farmers who voted in 
this district (
J
i β ) times the share of wheat farmers in constituency i ( i X ), plus the proportion 
of dairy farmers who voted multiplied by the share of dairy farmers in this constituency: 




i i X X T − + =
− β β  (3) 
                                        
4   The simple Goodman regression however, does not estimate the turnout per group, but the votes for free 
trade in one step.    17
Since we know the turnout, the true proportions of voters among wheat and dairy farmers 
must fall somewhere on a downward sloping line, whose slope is determined by the ratio of 




























β β  (5) 
If we had only one set of aggregate data, for example information on the turnout and the share 
of farmers for the whole of Sweden, this would be as far as we could go, but we have aggre-
gate data for every constituency. Each set of aggregate data, that is, each constituency, gives 
us such a line. They can all be drawn in one so-called tomography plot. This is informative, 
but does not provide enough information to get a clear solution. There is no exact way of re-
covering the values in the inner cells of table 3. The simplest assumption to start with is that 
the true proportions for each constituency are picked at random from some distribution, but 
that all constituencies are drawn from the same population. King focuses on the case where 
that distribution fits the joint probabilities to a truncated bivariate normal distribution so that 
all proportions are between 0 and 1. In order to get the parameters from the truncated bivariate 
normal distribution, King uses the lines from the above mentioned plot. The normality as-
sumption helps detect the mode on the tomography plot, where most of the lines cross, and 
improves estimates by ‘borrowing strength’ from other constituencies. Intuitively, the most 
likely values for 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are nearest the mode. Adding a couple of modest assumptions, 
five intermediate parameters that define the truncated bivariate distribution are estimated via a 
maximum likelihood function. The parameters are then transformed and rescaled. The means 
of the distribution of 
J
i β  and 
J
i
− β  are used as point estimates, and standard errors are based 
upon the variation in the simulated values. Thus King’s Algorithm provides sub-estimates for 
every constituency and thereby extracts much more information from the available data than 
simpler econometric tools. 
As a description of the methods used to estimate these parameters is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the interested reader is referred to King (1997) for more details.
5 Owing to the lack of 
primary data on the agricultural specialisation of the voters, we do not use the shares of wheat 
and dairy farmers, but those of voters from different income groups and owning estates of 
different values. Table 6 reports the results for beta (turnout) and lambda (votes for free 
trade). On the left, the results are shown for all constituencies; on the right, for those constitu-
encies where the several groups of voters made up more than 30 percent of the electorate. 
This was nowhere the case for voters who owned farms of between 10,000 and 30,000 Kro-
nor, for leaseholders and for voters who owed their right to vote to their income. As the geo-
                                        
5   We estimated the quantities of interest applying Benoit and King’s (2003) Ezi software.    18
graphical location of the voters here does not concern us, we can include at least part of these 
voters in the analysis. Our assumption is that those in the lowest income bracket (800 to 1000 
Kronor) reported in the national statistics earned wages, whereas those in the highest bracket 
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The results shown in table 6 evidence that generally, turnout was quiet low, particularly so for 
farmers with very little land and farmers with estates whose value exceeded the average (10,000 
to 30,000 Kronor). However, among smallholders turnout increased between spring and autumn 
1887. It also increased among richer estate owners (more than 10,000 Kronor), but fell of among 
middling farmers (2000 to 10,000 Kronor). This decline is even more obvious when we sepa-
rately consider the 128 constituencies where such middling farmers made up more than 30 per-
cent of the electorate. 
As for lambda, i.e. free trade support, both groups of voters who had the right to vote because 
they earned a yearly income of above 800 kronor had a slight preference for free trade. This did 
not appreciably change between spring and autumn 1887. Obviously, low income wage earners 
were opposed to agricultural protection because this would have increased the price of food. The 
behaviour of high income capitalists fits expectations derived from Bohlin’s (2009: 33 f.) analy-
sis of the impact of tariffs: agricultural tariffs harmed the members of this group, too. In contrast 
to them, agriculture did not vote homogeneously. In spring 1887, smallholders preferred free 
trade – even more so in regions where they were very concentrated, constituting more than 30 
percent of the voters. Large landowners, by contrast, preferred protection. However, in the au-
tumn election the picture changed. Even smallholders now developed a preference for protec-
tionism. Only where small farmers were concentrated did free trade supporters remain dominant. 
The changes may either indicate electoral manipulation in constituencies where large landowners 
were able to put pressure on smallholders, or the possibility that small farmers became convinced 
that protectionism would be the optimal policy for them as well. Below we will return to this 
question. 
First, however, we need to determine if the association between farm size (respectively value) 
and agricultural specialisation can be detected in voting behaviour, too. We do this by selecting 
the 30 percent of the constituencies where the output of wheat and the density of cows per hec-
tare farmland were highest, and by estimating the share of votes for free trade for these districts 
only. Table 7 shows the results for the constituencies dominated by wheat and by dairy farming.   21
Table 7: King’s estimates for lambda/votes for free trade (30 percent wheat and 30 percent dairy farming 














Agriculture (1000-2000 Kronor)  48 0.434 0.025 0.318 0.036
Agriculture (2000-10,000 Kronor)  45 0.396 0.026 0.316 0.030
Agriculture (10,000-30,000 Kronor)  49 0.444 0.048 0.300 0.041
Agriculture (more than 30,000 Kronor)  49 0.379 0.061 0.270 0.042
Owners of nonagricultural estates  54 0.472 0.024 0.394 0.028
Leaseholders  47 0.394 0.052 0.231 0.045
Very low incomes  54 0.461 0.016 0.463 0.021
Very high incomes  54 0.467 0.024 0.467 0.024
       
Dairy farming dominated constituencies              
Agriculture (1000-2000 Kronor)  48 0.640 0.027 0.439 0.04
Agriculture (2000-10,000 Kronor)  48 0.620 0.026 0.464 0.04
Agriculture (10,000-30,000 Kronor)  48 0.609 0.050 0.404 0.05
Agriculture (more than 30,000 Kronor)  43 0.512 0.070 0.335 0.06
Owners of nonagricultural estates  52 0.669 0.024 0.548 0.03
Leaseholders  46 0.551 0.063 0.303 0.06
Very low incomes  51 0.669 0.016 0.669 0.02
Very high incomes  52 0.665 0.025 0.664 0.03
 
The analysis bears out our core hypothesis that wheat producers favoured protection much more 
strongly than dairy farmers. This was the case in both elections. In dairy districts, owners of very 
large estates and leaseholders were the only groups whose support for free trade fell under 60 
percent in the election in spring 1887. The contrast to the constituencies where wheat farming 
dominated could not be stronger. There, in spring 1887 support for free trade nowhere reached 
50 percent; even c. 57 percent of the smallholders whose farms had a value of 1000 to 2000 Kro-
nor voted for protection. By autumn, the picture had changed markedly. The general tendency of 
voters from dairy districts to be more supportive of free trade than voters from wheat districts 
remained, but free trade support diminished in both types of constituencies and among almost all 
groups of voters. The only group where it slightly increased were voters who had gained their 
right to participate in elections because they had a taxable income of at least 800 kronor per year, 
and who fell in the poorest category within this group. Conceivably, in the face of intensifying 
protectionist propaganda these voters became increasingly worried about food prices. 
There is one final question we need to examine: that of the causes of the break down of the free 
trade vote between spring and autumn 1887. Was this due to manipulation or rather to a change 
of mind among erstwhile opponents of protectionism? As for possible manipulations, our hy-
pothesis is that these would most likely occur in constituencies where the elections were indirect, 
as here occasionally open voting was still practiced. Accordingly, we select the indirect constitu-
encies and analyse them separately, expecting the smallholders’ vote for free trade to have been 
weaker here than the in the mean of all Swedish constituencies (cf. table 6). Table 8 shows the 
results.   22
Table 8: King’s estimates for lambda/votes for free trade (constituencies where voting was indirect) 
 
  1887 spring election  1887 autumn election 









Agriculture (1000-2000 Kronor)  59 0.566 0.018 40 0.414 0.031
Agriculture (2000-10,000 Kronor)  58 0.550 0.016 40 0.426 0.022
Agriculture (10,000-30,000 Kronor)  58 0.560 0.033 41 0.397 0.038
Agriculture (more than 30,000 Kronor)  50 0.461 0.049 36 0.336 0.033
Owners of nonagricultural estates  60 0.574 0.019 41 0.441 0.026
Leaseholders  55 0.516 0.036 39 0.325 0.040
Very low incomes  59 0.574 0.012 40 0.510 0.015
Very high incomes  60 0.572 0.018 41 0.506 0.017
 
Our estimates based on King’s algorithm show that in actual fact the opposite was true. In indi-
rect constituencies, the vote for free trade was in both elections stronger than on average, i.e. 
when all Sweden is considered. If there was any electoral manipulation at all, it was clearly not 
associated with districts where voting was indirect and possibly not secret. This leaves us with 
one conclusion: In the course of the summer 1887, some farmers who in spring had still voted 
for free trade changed their political allegiance and became supporters of protectionism.  
5.   Conclusion 
In 1888, the Swedish government introduced tariffs for a number of agricultural and industrial 
goods. Frequently regarded as the outcome of a ‘quirk of fate’, to use Lewin’s (1988: 47) expres-
sion – i.e. of a tax scandal that cost the free trade supporting members for Stockholm their seats 
in parliament –, this change in policies would actually have been impossible without the severe 
losses that the free traders suffered in the general election of autumn 1887. If these losses had not 
occurred, the protectionists would have had to discover at least three other parliamentarians who 
favoured free trade and had failed to pay their taxes (i.e. 26 instead of 23) in order to gain a ma-
jority in parliament. Thus, while the first general election of 1887 kept the free traders in power 
for another six months, the second election did really play a crucial role in the realignment of 
Sweden’s tariff policies a year later. 
In the present article, we ask how and why this shift in voting behaviour came about. Specifi-
cally, we ask which groups of voters voted for free trade in the two elections, and examine if 
their decisions match expectations that can be formed on the basis of trade models such as the 
specific factor models, that is, if voting behaviour can be considered rational.  
In order to answer these questions, we first determine which groups of voters would have bene-
fited from protectionism and which would have suffered. We do this on the basis of information 
on their income and on the amounts of land they owned or leased, and of data on farm sizes and 
the mix of agricultural outputs produced in the constituencies. This data allows us to determine 
that there was a close association between the size of the voters’ estates and their agricultural 
specialisation, with voters who owned or leased large estates producing import competing com-  23
modities such as wheat. Smallholders, by contrast, focused on animal husbandry and were 
threatened by international competition to a much smaller degree or not at all.  
In our analysis, we first apply Goodman’s approach to election analysis in order to provides ro-
bustness checks for the results we obtain with the more modern and sophisticated method, i.e. 
King’s algorithm. We find that voters who did not own or lease land consistently favoured free 
trade. Agricultural voters, however, evidenced interesting variations between estate sizes, and 
important changes between the spring and autumn elections. In the spring election, it were only 
the voters with the largest farms (that had a value of more than 30,000 Kronor) and leaseholders 
(who had to rent land with a value of at least 6000 Kronor in order to be allowed to vote) whose 
support for free trade fell below 50 percent. In the autumn election, by contrast, even 60 percent 
of the smallholders voted for protection. By separately analysing constituencies where voting 
was indirect and occasionally still open, we determine that electoral manipulation or pressure 
that the owners of large estates exerted on smallholders is unlikely to be responsible for this 
shift. Apparently, small and middling farmers decisively changed their trade political outlook 
between spring and autumn 1887. As trade balances did not change so quickly, some other influ-
ence – likely enough protectionist propaganda – must have had a crucial impact in the course of 
the summer months 1887. Apparently, not only farmers who were really exposed to competition 
from abroad, such as wheat producers, were susceptible to anti-free trade arguments, but small 
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Appendix: Maps 
Figure 3: Wheat farming 1885 
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Figure 4: Rye farming 1885 
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Figure 5: Dairy farming 1885 
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Figure 6: Pig farming 1885 
Source: BISOS (1890). 
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